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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE COURT RULES 
Plaintiffs submit that the following supplemental court 
rules are applicable and relevant. 
Rule 2.7(e) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, 1983 Replacement, 
provides: 
"(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required 
by any Rule of Civil Procedure shall not be received 
except on stipulation of the parties or for good cause 
shown." [Emphasis supplied.] 
Rule 4-103(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
not effective until on or after October 30, 1988, provides: 
"(A) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring 
written notice shall be heard only after written notice 
served no less than five (5) days prior to the date 
specified in the notice for hearing, unless the Court for 
good cause shown orders the period of time for notice of 
hearing shortened, 
"(B) Documents in support of law and motion matters, 
including returns of service on supplemental orders and 
bench warrants, must be filed in the Clerk's office at 
least two days before the hearing on the matter. 
"(C) Proceedings based upon supporting documents 
which are not filed in accordance with this rule may be 
dismissed," [Emphasis supplied.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no question but that dismissal of plaintiffs1 
action based on Utah's four year statute of limitations was in 
error. Since the error is plain, this Court has full power not 
only to order a one day extension of time to appeal but also to 
reverse the order of dismissal. 
The district court had before it proferred facts upon which 
a one day extension should have been granted. The district court 
abused its discretion in not doing so. Alternatively, the 
district court erred in not permitting the plaintiff Walter Park 
Larson, who had driven from California in order to personally 
appear at the hearing on the motion, to present any concrete 
evidence as to either his reasons for filing an appeal one day 
late or his reasons for not having filed an affidavit in suppport 
of his pro se motion for a one day extension. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ERROR OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
AMENDED COMPLAINT IS PLAIN AND CLEAR. THIS COURT HAS FULL 
POWER NOT ONLY TO REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT ON THE EXTENSION 
OF TIME ISSUE BUT ON THE DISMISSAL ISSUE AS WELL. 
Two things are clear about this appeal. 
The first is that Judge Frederick dismissed plaintiffs' 
amended complaint in error; the second is that unless this court 
intervenes, as it has full power to do, these plaintiffs will not 
have their claims litigated, notwithstanding the clear error 
which occurred below. 
Without restating the argument on the dismissal issue 
contained in plaintiffs' opening brief, plaintiff notes that the 
amended complaint alleges breach of fiduciary duty, unjust 
enrichment and conversion, among other matters. The affidavit of 
Walter Park Larson states that the assets subject to these 
allegations were intact as of a date within four years' prior to 
the filing of plaintiff's original complaint (R. 50, Add. 3). 
This affidavit creates a clear issue of fact which precludes 
dismissal of plaintiffs' suit on grounds of Utah's four year 
statute of limitations. And, as stated in plaintiff's opening 
brief, there is no evidence in the record to support defendants' 
conclusion that the plan of reorganization repudiates the 
contract in question, since the plan itself was never put into 
the record of these proceedings. 
Judge Frederick granted defendants' motion most likely 
because he did not read Mr. Larson's affidavit. The affidavit of 
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Peter Waldo, prior counsel to plaintiffs, states: 
"During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, 
I was asked by the Court whether I had filed an 
Affidavit on behalf of my client in opposition to 
the Motion. I answered the Court no I had not filed 
an Affidavit, however, an Affidavit was filed by 
the Larson's previous counsel in opposition to the 
Motion" (R. 88, Add. 7). 
If he had read the affidavit, there is no question but that 
Judge Frederick would have denied the motion. 
Plaintiffs submit that this court has full power not only to 
reverse the district court on the extension issue but on the 
dismissal issue as well, notwithstanding defendants1 citation to 
Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 553 P. 2d 885, 899 
(Kan. 1976). Kansas appellate court rules apparently require 
assignments of error. Plaintiffs are aware of no ruling by this 
court equating the docketing statement with assignments of error 
as used in Kansas. 
Moreoever, this court has full power to recognize and remedy 
plain errors "even though such errors were not raised or were not 
properly raised by the parties," just as the federal courts do. 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 361, 32 Am Jur 2d 845. In 
this case, prior counsel did not include the dismissal issue in 
the docketing statement on this appeal because that issue was 
already the subject of a separate appeal. Judicial economy 
justifies eliminating a second appeal to address the issue of the 
dismissal, in the event of reversal on the extension of time 
issue. 
The pivotal issues then become should this court intervene, 
and if so, in what manner. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD INTERVENE AND FIND REVERSIBLE ERROR 
SO THAT PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS CAN BE HEARD. 
A. The District Court committed reversible error in 
refusing to grant a one day extension of time to 
appeal based on the record it had before it. 
Not having been present at the proceedings below, 
undersigned counsel must defer to the conclusion of defendants1 
counsel that the September 13, 1988 Affidavit of Walter Park 
Larson (R. 93-95, Add. 10) was not presented to Judge Frederick 
(Resp. Br. 6). Indeed, Judge Frederick did not have the 
information contained in that affidavit because he refused to 
receive it. That refusal itself was error, as is argued below. 
But the District Court did have before it a detailed factual 
statement in the form of a pro se Notice of Extension of Time to 
Appeal and a pro se Notice of Appeal, both of which included 
these proferred facts: 
1. That plaintiffs had received no notice of entry of 
judgment; 
2. That plaintiffs were moving to California and had been 
out of state from July through the date of the Notice of Appeal; 
3. That plaintiffs had communicated to their attorney that 
they wished to appeal; 
4. That plaintiffs1 attorney had stated that he would 
appeal or move for a rehearing (R. 75-76, Add. 5). 
There is nothing in the record to show any objection by 
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defendants to these facts proferred. These facts, coupled with 
the obvious fact that plaintiffs filed a pro se notice of appeal 
immediately upon learning that the time to appeal had run, 
support the conclusion that the district court erred in not 
granting plaintiffs a one day extension. 
In responding to plaintiffs1 opening brief, defendants do 
not respond to plaintiff's citation of In re Buckingham Super 
Markets, Inc. , 631 F. 2d 763 (D. C. C. A., 1980), in which 
excusable neglect was found from confusion over which counsel 
would file the appeal. Therein the court stated that the 
"excusable neglect standard has been applied with diminishing 
rigidity" and extensions "are available upon the proper showing." 
631 F. 2d at 765. Plaintiffs made such a showing and should have 
received an extension, particularly in light of the lack of any 
Rule 58A(d) notice of entry of the order of dismissal. 
B. The District Court committed reversible error in 
denying to plaintiffs the opportunity to justify 
their request for a one day extension. 
The only record available of what transpired below is the 
September 13, 1988 Affidavit of Mr. Larson in which he explains 
that after having driven all the way from California for the 
hearing, he "was not allowed to speak." (R. 95, Add. 10). ' As 
1/Undersigned counsel has no more first hand knowledge of what 
transpired below than this Court does since he did not appear 
until. Undersigned counsel has called Judge Frederick's 
court reporter only to be informed that no transcript was 
made of either the hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss, or 
of the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to 
appeal. 
is apparent from his affidavit, Mr. Larson had many more detailed 
reasons, not considered by the court, for which the notice of 
appeal was filed one day late, several of which include severe 
family illnesses and hardships. Yet none of this was considered 
by the court because Mr. Larson was not permitted to talk. This 
was reversible error. 
In so stating, plaintiffs recognize that the applicable 
rules require submission of affidavits prior to hearing. 
However, Rule 2.7(e) of the Rules of Practice, in effect at the 
time of this hearing, ' expressly provides for the waiver of 
the affidavit requirement for "good cause shown." These 
plaintiffs were not permitted to show good cause for anything 
because Mr. Larson was not permitted to speak. This was error. 
Plaintiffs concede that the customary standard of review for 
a lower court's decision on a motion for extension of time to 
appeal is abuse of discretion (Resp. Br. 7-8). However, the 
lower court must, at a minimum, provide an opportunity to show 
good cause. In this case, that means, at a minimum, the 
opportunity to explain the unavailability of a supporting 
affidavit. 
On many occasions, this court has made its feelings clear 
on the affidavit issue in the context of a motion for summary 
2/ The Utah Code of Judicial Administration version of this rule 
was not effective until on or after October 30, 1988, which is 
after the hearings were held in this case. Nevertheless, 
plaintiffs submit that these new rules require the same 
result. 
judgment, cf. inter alia, Strand v. Associated Students of 
University of Utah, 561 P. 2d 191 (Ut., 1977); Cox v_._ Winters, 
678 P. 2d 311 (Ut., 1984). On such occasions, the court has 
found an abuse of discretion where the district court granted 
summary judgment over a request for an additional opportunity to 
state facts in opposition to the motion. Ibid. 
In this case, the district court erred precisely because Mr. 
Larson, who had come from California for the hearing after having 
proceeded pro se as best he could, was denied the opportunity to 
explain anything. Therefore, at a minimum, this court should 
remand these proceedings to Judge Frederick to afford to the 
plaintiffs an opportunity to show good cause for the filing of 
their appeal, one day late. 
Finally, plaintiffs note that respondents repeatedly 
attribute the failure to file a timely appeal to the lack of 
diligence of plaintiffs1 prior counsel. Yet defendants 
themselves remain remiss in not providing to plaintiffs a Rule 
58A(d) notice of entry of judgment. This omission should 
definitely be considered by the court in making its decision on 
plaintiffs1 appeal, otherwise there is no purpose or intent 
to Rule 58A(d) and this court might as well order it erased from 
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District Court, grant 
plaintiffs1 motion for an extension of time to appeal, and, at 
the same time, reverse the order of dismissal of the District 
8 
Court. Alternatively, this Court remand this case to the 
District Court with instructions to take and consider plaintiffs' 
evidence as to their reasons for filing a notice of appeal one 
day late. 
DATED this \^ day of October, 1989 
L. Edward Robbins 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
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